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ISSUES IN APPRAISAL REGULATION:
THE CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE
MORTGAGE LENDING PROCESS
J Kevin Murray*
Although inflated appraisalsplayed a key role in each of the last two
major nationalfinancial crises, regulators have been unable to ensure
appraisal accuracy. As a result, self-interested parties to loan
transactions can coerce appraisers to inflate appraisal values for
nothing more than the promise of future business. What's more, the
complex and convoluted appraisal regulatory system is powerless to
detect andprevent such inappropriateconduct. As Congress once again
examines the financial industry and explores meaningful reform, it is
imperative that self-interestedparties be removed from the appraiserselection process and appraisal regulatory responsibilities be
consolidatedat the federal level.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S. Biology, United States
Air Force Academy, May 2002. 1 would like to extend my deepest thanks to Lauren E. Willis,
Professor of Law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, Josh Rosenberg, Julien Kern, and Elena
DeCoste Grieco. Their guidance and support made this Article possible. I would also like to thank
all the staffers and editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their tireless efforts and
patience in preparing this Article for publication.
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INTRODUCTION

During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, inaccurate real
estate appraisals played a significant role in the collapse of hundreds
of financial institutions and the loss of billions of dollars.' Banks and
lending institutions relied upon inflated appraisals in providing large
loans that were not fully secured by actual collateral values. 2 In 1985,
the portfolios of more than eight hundred federally insured lending
institutions contained under-secured loans supported by real estate
appraisals that overvalued collateral properties by an aggregate of $3
billion.' When borrowers defaulted on these loans, lending
institutions were unable to recoup loan balances that exceeded
collateral values.' Consequently, many of these institutions were
severely weakened or declared insolvent.'
In the wake of the savings and loan crisis, Congress conducted
an extensive examination of the appraisal industry.' The examination
revealed a number of factors that contributed to the inaccuracy of
real estate appraisals.' One factor of particular concern was the
frequency with which appraisers submitted to pressure exerted by
parties involved in the loan-origination process.! In exchange for
explicit or implicit promises of future business, many appraisers
supplied predetermined values rather than independent and accurate
opinions of market value.' Such misconduct often went unchecked
within the fragmented structure of the real estate appraisal industry."
Because individual participants in the appraisal industry maintained
policies and procedures independent of one another, appraisal
regulation was fragmented and inconsistent." The inability or
unwillingness of real estate industry participants to cooperate with
one another inhibited the detection and discipline of dishonest and
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

H.R. REP. No. 99-891, at 4 (1986).
Id
Id.
Id at 4-7.
Id at 1-2, 4.

6. Id. at 1-2.
7. Id. at7-12.
8. Id. at 8, 41-42; Vernon Martin 111, AppraisalFraud and How I Works, 108 BANKING
L.J. 144, 145-46 (1991).
9. H.R. REP. No. 99-891, at 8, 41-42; see Martin, supra note 8, at 145-46.
10. See H.R. REP.No. 99-891, at 8,42-44.
11. Id. at 42-44.
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incompetent appraisers. 2 Under those circumstances, appraisers
could generate inaccurate appraisals without fear of retribution. 3
Consequently, appraisal inaccuracy became so pervasive that
Congress declared it a "serious national problem" requiring broad
corrective measures.14
Congress responded with legislation." Title XI of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("Title
XI")'' was created specifically to promote the accuracy and
reliability of appraisals used in connection with federally related"
transactions." In an effort to prevent appraisal inaccuracies resulting
from pressure exerted upon appraisers by third parties, Congress
included a provision in Title XI mandating that all appraisals be
independently and impartially prepared.19 Additionally, in an attempt
to ensure effective regulation of the appraisal industry under Title
XI, Congress created a complex regulatory system within which
regulatory responsibilities are distributed among federal, state, and
private agencies.2 0
In spite of the passage of Title XI, inaccurate appraisals remain
problematic. During the past decade, inflated appraisals were
commonly used to support loans that were packaged as mortgagebacked securities and sold to investors on the secondary market.
12. Id.

13. Id. at 43.
14. Id. at 4.
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-580T, REGULATORY PROGRAMS:
OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT OF THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL INDUSTRY 1 (2004);

see Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§§ 1101-22, 103 Stat. 183, 511-19 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3352 (2006)).
16. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act §§ 1101-22.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 3350(4) ("The term 'federally related transaction' means any real estaterelated financial transaction which-(A) a federal financial institutions regulatory agency or the
Resolution Trust Corporation engages in, contracts for, or regulates; and (B) requires the services
of an appraiser.").
18. Id. § 3331 ("The purpose of [Title XI] is to provide that Federal financial and public
policy interests in real estate related transactions will be protected by requiring that real estate
appraisals utilized in connection with federally related transactions are performed in writing, in
accordance with uniform standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated and
whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision.").
19. Id. § 3350(10) (defining a written appraisal as "a written statement . . . that is
independently and impartially prepared").
20. See id. §§ 3331-3352; see generally Cherokee W. Wooley, Regulation of Real Estate
Appraisers and Appraisals: The Effects of FIRREA, 43 EMORY L.J. 357, 358-59 (1994)

(outlining the distribution of regulatory responsibilities under Title XI).
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These inflated appraisals fueled rapid and unsustainable growth in
the housing market.21 When the market crashed in 2006 and housing
prices fell, the consequences of inflated appraisals became painfully
apparent.22 At present, mortgage balances exceed home values by an
estimated $745 billion.23 Moreover, new research suggests that when
home values fall below 75 percent of the amounts owed on
mortgages, many homeowners walk away.24 With the values of 4.5
million homes currently below this critical threshold, desperate
homeowners are defaulting on their mortgages at an increased rate,
leaving financial institutions and investors to absorb enormous
losses.25 Indeed, a number of established financial institutions have
either declared bankruptcy or been severely weakened."b
In the aftermath of the current home mortgage crisis, mortgageindustry participants and regulators have initiated a dialogue to
identify the sources and causes of the crisis. Once again inaccurate
appraisals are receiving considerable attention. 28 Appraisers, lenders,
brokers, agents, and regulators all agree that loan origination parties
extensively pressured appraisers 29 to deliver appraisal values
necessary to close transactions.30 Industry participants and regulators
also agree that appraisal inflation became pervasive under the
inconsistent and fragmented regulatory system of Title XI.

21. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape,

14 FORDHAM J.CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 725 (2009).
22. See id. at 709-10, 741-43.
23. David Streitfeld, No Help in Sight, More Homeowners Walk Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,

2010, at Al; see also Schmudde, supra note 21, at 742.
24. Streitfeld, supra note 23.

25. Andrew J. Ceresney et al., Regulatory Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Search

for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 225, 227-28 (2009).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Strengthening Oversight and Preventing Fraud in FHA and Other HUD
Programs:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on

FinancialServs., 111th Cong. 5-7 (2009) [hereinafter Strengthening] (statement of Kenneth M.
Donohue, Sr., Inspector Gen., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).
28. See, e.g., id

29. For the purposes of this Article, the term "loan origination party" refers to participants
involved in the origination of new loans and the refinancing of existing loans.
30. Schmudde, supra note 21, at 742.
31. See, e.g., The Real Estate Appraisal Industry: Hearing on Certain Private Entities as
Outlined in Title X of the FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
That Establish Unform Rules for Real Estate Appraisals and Set Minimum Criteriafor Certifying
Appraisers Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportationof the S. Comm. on Banking,
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Appraisal standards were not adequately enforced in the absence of
effective federal oversight.32 As a result, appraisers who overvalued
properties were able to navigate loopholes and exploit inefficiencies
without repercussions. 33
The similarities between the savings and loan crisis and the
current home mortgage crisis are troubling. Inaccurate appraisals
played identical roles in both crises, demonstrating the systemic and
recurring nature of the problem. Although well-intentioned, the Title
XI regulatory system failed to ensure the accuracy and reliability of
appraisals. As such, appraisal inaccuracy will inevitably continue to
cause devastating financial consequences unless broad and decisive
corrective measures are taken. In order to prevent such future harm,
appraisals must be insulated from pressure exerted by self-interested
loan origination parties, and appraisal regulatory responsibilities
must be consolidated at the federal level. Given the importance of
accurate and reliable appraisals, such action is long overdue.
This Article addresses circumstances within the mortgage and
appraisal industries that facilitate the production of inaccurate
appraisals. Part II examines the nature and importance of appraisals,
and it outlines some of the ways in which they are manipulated. Part
III discusses conflicts of interest in the loan origination process and
proposes a means of eliminating the influence of those interests on
appraisals. Part IV examines deficiencies in the appraisal regulatory
structure under Title XI and proposes consolidation of regulatory
responsibilities at the federal level. Part V concludes that appraisal
procedures and regulations must be drastically reformed to avoid
another real property bubble and ensuing financial crisis.

Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 92 (2004) (statement of the National Association of
Realtors).
32. See Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 200-02

(2005) [hereinafter Legislative Solutions] (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief Executive
Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
33. See id. at 201.
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II. THE ROLE OF APPRAISALS IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE
When appraisers overvalue homes in response to pressure, key
mortgage industry participants are exposed to increased risk.34 When
inflated appraisals are used to support home mortgages, borrowers
are saddled with debts that exceed home values.35 If borrowers are
unable or unwilling to repay these excessive mortgages, lenders,
secondary market investors, and federal mortgage insurers suffer
substantial financial losses when actual home values cannot cover
outstanding mortgage balances.3 6 As such losses mount, major
financial institutions collapse, and federal financial resources are
severely jeopardized."
A. The Typical Home Mortgage Transaction

To better understand the critical function of appraisals in the
context of real estate finance, it is helpful to consider two typical
home mortgage transactions. At the outset of a home sale, a buyer
and seller agree on the price of a home and the buyer approaches a
mortgage broker or proceeds directly to a lender to obtain a mortgage
to finance the purchase of the home. Alternatively, a homeowner
wishing to access home equity might obtain a home equity loan or
access cash through refinancing an existing mortgage. In either case,
the lender considers the borrower's creditworthiness and the value of
the home in assessing the soundness of the requested mortgage or
refinance. The borrower promises to make periodic payments on the
loan and gives the lender a lien on the home as collateral to secure
the mortgage. In the event that the borrower defaults, the lender
relies upon the value of the home to recover the outstanding balance.
To ensure its recovery of the outstanding mortgage balance, the
lender typically lends only a percentage-typically 80 percent-of
the market value of the home.38 This is the maximum amount that
34. Id at 197-98; Strengthening,supra note 27 , at 67-68 (statement of Kevin K. Nunnink,
Chairman, IRR-Residential, LLC, and Chairman, Integra Realty Resources).
35. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 198 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
36. See Strengthening, supra note 27, at 67 (testimony of Kevin K. Nunnink, Chairman,
IRR-Residential, LLC, and Chairman, Integra Realty Resources); Schmudde, supra note 21, at
742.
37. See supra Part I.
38. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 199 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company); Schmudde, supra note 21, at 742
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can be extended while reasonably ensuring the lender's ability to
recoup the outstanding loan balance through a foreclosure sale in the
event of default.3 ' Accordingly, the lender seeks an appraiser to
determine the market value of the home. If the requested loan
amount is within the maximum percentage of the appraised market
value, the lender will likely approve the loan.
After extending the loan, the lender can sell the loan to
government-sponsored entities (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.40 The GSEs use mortgages to create mortgage-backed
securities to sell to investors on the secondary market. 4' In such
transactions, investors indirectly rely on appraisals in evaluating the
quality of the loans supporting the securities they purchase.4 2
B. The AppraisalPreparationProcess

In preparing real estate appraisals, appraisers must collect,
verify, and analyze all information necessary to develop and support
credible opinions of value. To aid in this task, appraisers employ one
or more of three valuation approaches, depending on the type of
property being appraised; these consist of the sales comparison
approach,43 the cost approach, and the income capitalization
approach." For residential property appraisals, appraisers most
commonly use the sales comparison approach.4 5 Under the sales
comparison approach, the appraiser deems a property to have
approximately the same value as similar properties in the area,46
which are commonly referred to as "comparables." 4 7 An appraiser
("The industry standard has been that the maximum amount of a mortgage given on a specific
property should not exceed 80% of the appraised value.").
39. See Schmudde, supra note 21, at 742.
40. See id. at 737-38.
4 1. Id.

42. See Wooley, supra note 20, at 361.
43. This is also referred to as the "market data approach." See WILLIAM L. VENTOLO, JR. &
MARTHA R. WILLIAMS, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 68 (1975).

44. See Schmudde, supra note 21, at 741 n. 114; Jason S. Kirwan, Appraising a
Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of Specific Performancein Real Estate Contracts,
47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 697, 712-16 (2005).
45. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 4; see VENTOLO & WILLIAMS, supra
note 43, at 67.
46. UNIF. STANDARDS OF PROF'L APPRAISAL PRACTICE R. 1-4 (Appraisal Standards Bd.
2008).
47. See, e.g., id.; VENTOLO & WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 77.
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using the sales comparison approach must first identify recently sold
comparables.48 The sale prices of these comparables establish a
baseline value for the property.49 The appraiser then adjusts this
baseline value to reflect the value of any major differences"o between
the comparables and the property being appraised." The resulting
figure serves as the preliminary appraisal value.52
In addition to using comparable sales data, appraisers must
identify and analyze any other variables affecting the property's
market value." For example, an appraiser might consider the effects
of existing or reasonably probable land-use regulations or trends in
the local real estate market.54 These variables, which are often
dynamic and ambiguous, can be difficult to quantify. As such, an
appraiser must make assumptions that are supported by available
information." For example, an appraiser evaluating a property
subject to a potential zoning ordinance would need to make
assumptions regarding both the likelihood of the ordinance's
enactment and of the effect of the ordinance on the property's market
value." After carefully analyzing comparable sales data and
adjusting for other relevant variables, the appraiser should arrive at a
figure that accurately reflects the market value of the appraised
property.
C. The Subjective Nature ofAppraisals

Although appraisers use methods such as the sales comparison
approach to enhance objectivity and accuracy, appraising is an
imperfect science. The accuracy of any appraisal is subject to a
number of variables, including the availability and reliability of
information." The potential for inaccuracy in the preparation of real
estate appraisals is especially evident in the sales comparison
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See VENTOLO & WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 77.
See id
See id.
See id.
See id.
UNIF. STANDARDS OF PROF'L APPRAISAL PRACTICE R. 1-4 (Appraisal Standards Bd.

2008).
54. Id. R. 1-3(a).
55. Id R. 1-2(f).

56. See id.
R. 1-3(a).
57. See Wooley, supra note 20, at 362.
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approach, where the selection and adjustment of comparables
provide baseline values for the final appraisal. The utility of this
approach is constrained by the availability of comparable sales
data." If no recent comparable sales data is available, appraisers
cannot use the approach." Furthermore, even where adequate
comparable sales data is available, the data may not be reliable."o For
example, if the sale of a comparable is not a valid arm's length
transaction, the sale price will not reflect the true market value of the
property." An appraisal based on such a transaction will not
accurately indicate the property's market value. Consequently, where
information is limited or unreliable, even appraisals prepared by the
most competent and conscientious appraisers are prone to
inaccuracy.
In addition to limitations in the availability and reliability of
information, the competency and judgment of individual appraisers
can also affect the accuracy of real estate appraisals. Within the sales
comparison approach, the selection of comparable property sales and
the evaluation of adjustment features are products of each appraiser's
knowledge, experience, and discretion in assessing similarity and
value. As such, an appraiser's subjective evaluations can directly
influence the final determination of a property's value. For example,
two independent appraisers evaluating the same piece of property
might choose different comparables. Alternatively, even if the two
appraisers were to choose the same set of comparables, each might
estimate different adjustment values or identify different adjustment
features altogether. In either case, the appraisers would likely arrive
at different final appraisal values, one or both of which would
necessarily be inaccurate.62
Given the extensive subjectivity and ambiguity inherent in the
appraisal process, there is an abundance of legitimate reasons for
inaccuracy in real estate appraisals. Because an appraisal is an
opinion of value, often based on imperfect information and
undefined variables, perfect accuracy cannot be expected. A margin
of error must be assumed. As such, an inaccurate appraisal based on
58.
59.
60.
61.

See
See
See
See

id
id.
id.
id.

62. Theoretically, there can be only one true market value.
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erroneous but good-faith assumptions can nonetheless be valid as an
opinion of value. However, a problem arises when appraisers
intentionally exploit the subjectivity and ambiguity in the appraisal
process to reach predetermined values. Such misconduct corrupts the
valuation function of appraisals and can have severe consequences
for those who rely on them.13
Unfortunately, unscrupulous appraisers can manipulate the
subjective appraisal process in a number of ways to reach
predetermined values. An appraiser wishing to inflate an appraisal
can exaggerate the size or condition of a property.' For example, an
appraiser might misrepresent an unfinished basement as a habitable
space and overvalue the home accordingly." Additionally, appraisers
often overlook deferred maintenance or defective construction.66 In
the Poconos area of Pennsylvania, appraisers ignored the deficient
construction of hundreds of homes in order to satisfy the developers
who hired them.6 7 Accordingly, buyers who could not detect the
faulty construction relied on inflated appraisals in purchasing homes
at prices that seemed reasonable compared to those in nearby New
York City.6 Later, when the borrowers tried to sell or refinance their
homes, they discovered that the difference between the prices they
paid and their homes' market values was as much as $80,000.69 Since
1995, one in five mortgaged homes in the area-nearly 6,000 in
total-has been foreclosed on.o
Appraisals can also be manipulated in more subtle ways. As
previously discussed, an appraiser can intentionally make poor
assumptions about unavailable or incomplete information relevant to

63. See supra Part I.

64. See Martin, supra note 8, at 154.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 154-55.
67. See Broken Dreams in the Poconos: The Response of the Secondary Markets and
Implications for Federal Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th
Cong. 200-01 (2004) [hereinafter Poconos] (statement of Gary P. Taylor, President, Appraisal
Institute).
68. Debbie Nathan, Buying a Piece of Hell, CITY LIMITS, Oct. 15, 2003,
http://www.citylimits.org/news/article.cfm?article-id=2978.
69. See id.
70. See Poconos, supra note 67, at 200 (statement of Gary P. Taylor, President, Appraisal
Institute).
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property valuation." For instance, an appraiser might assume that a
property will be subject to favorable re-zoning or high market
demand, either of which would increase the property's market
value. 72 Alternatively, an appraiser could select comparables
dissimilar to a property being appraised. 3 During an economic
downturn in Denver, Colorado in the early 2000s, appraisers used
outdated comparable sales data to support high appraisal values.7 4
Although actual home values declined as a result of the troubled
economy, appraisers justified inflated appraisals with comparable
sales data from a more prosperous period." As a result, appraisers
artificially propped up the Denver real estate market at an
unsustainable level for a full year, during which many homebuyers
purchased overvalued homes." Although such misconduct is subtle,
the resulting harm is severe.

III.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST PROMOTE APPRAISAL INFLATION

Although accurate appraisals are critical to the health of the
home mortgage industry, parties involved in the mortgageorigination process often compromise the independence of appraisers
and corrupt the accuracy of appraisals." Under traditional underwriting principles, the appraisal is a crucial factor in determining
whether parties can complete loan transactions." As such, the parties
have conflicting interests in obtaining appraisals that "hit the
numbers" needed to complete transactions." In pursuit of these
incentives, many loan-origination parties pressure appraisers to
deliver the predetermined values required to close transactions."o As

71. See Martin, supranote 8, at 152.
72. See id.

73. See id. at 155-56.
74. See DAVID CALLAHAN, DEMOS, HOME INSECURITY: HOW WIDESPREAD APPRAISAL
FRAuD PuTS HOMEOWNERS AT RISK 6 (2004).
75. See id.
76. See id.

77. See Martin, supra note 8, at 145-46.
78. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 198-99 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
79. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 99-891, at 8 (1986).
80. See Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 198-99 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel,
Chief Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company); H.R. REP. NO. 99-891, at 8.
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appraisers succumb to this pressure at an alarming rate," it seems
that regulations intended to maintain appraiser independence and
appraisal accuracy are ineffective. Consequently, if independent and
accurate appraisals are to safeguard financial interests in mortgage
transactions, appraisal regulation must be reformed to remove
interested parties from positions of influence over appraisers.
A. Self-Interested PartiesInfluence Appraisals

Unfortunately, the interests of parties involved in the loan
origination process often conflict with the preparation of accurate
appraisals.8 2 At times, these parties exploit the subjective appraisal
preparation process by pressuring appraisers to deliver favorable
appraisals." Because appraisers rely on loan origination parties for
continuous work, many inflate appraisals to meet expectations.84
One party with an interest in inflated appraisals is the borrower.
As previously discussed, the typical home sale involves a prospective
homebuyer who agrees to purchase a home and seeks a mortgage in
the amount of the agreed-upon price." For the buyer to complete the
purchase, the home's appraisal value must support a mortgage in the
requested amount.86 Similarly, many homeowners refinance their
homes to obtain equity for specific purposes, such as to pay off credit
card debt or purchase a car." In such cases, the appraisal determines
the maximum amount of equity available to the refinancing
homeowner. Thus, the borrower's ability to pay off debts or make
purchases depends on the sufficiency of the appraisal to support the
refinance." Even though independent and accurate appraisals protect
borrowers from overvalued homes and overwhelming debt, those
interests are often overcome by borrowers' more immediate interests
81. See Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 198-99 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel,

Chief Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company) (citing recent survey that showed
55 percent of appraisers have felt pressure to overstate an appraisal, with a quarter of those saying
it happens nearly half of the time, and many appraisers actually succumbing to that pressure).
82. See id. (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief Executive Officer, Iowa Residential
Appraisal Company).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See supra Part II.A.

86. See Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 198-99 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel,
Chief Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
87. See CALLAHAN, supra note 74, at 2.
88. See id at 3.
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in purchasing homes or paying off smaller debts.89 For these reasons,
borrowers have strong incentives to pressure appraisers to inflate
home values.
In addition to the borrower, other mortgage-origination parties
often stand to benefit from appraisal inflation. Loan officers and
mortgage brokers, who are compensated upon the completion of
mortgage transactions, have an obvious interest in ensuring that
mortgage transactions close quickly and without issue.90 An appraisal
value insufficient to support the desired loan amount could
jeopardize the completion of a mortgage transaction and prevent the
loan officers and brokers from being paid." Furthermore, because
loan officers and brokers are generally paid a commission based on a
percentage of the loan amount, these parties have an interest in
obtaining inflated appraisals that support elevated loan amounts and
translate to increased fees.92 Accordingly, loan officers and brokers
have incentives to pressure appraisers to overvalue collateral
properties in order to ensure the quick completion of high-volume
mortgage transactions.
Although lenders appear to have firm interests in obtaining
accurate appraisals, those interests have been undermined by changes
in the mortgage industry. With the advent of the secondary loan
market, lenders can now sell loans to GSEs and thereby pass on the
underlying risk to investors.93 As a result, the risk-mitigation function
of the appraisal has become much less important to many lenders.94
Because lenders may not bear the long-term risks of the loans they
make, many are willing to overlook or even promote appraisals
inflated to satisfy the GSEs and secondary market investors." Such
complacency is especially problematic because loan officers who
89. See Martin, supra note 8, at 145.
90. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 198-99 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
91. Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers: Hearing on Exploring How
Homebuyers and Homeowners Can Be Safeguarded From Predatory and Abusive Mortgage
Products and Practices Before the Subcomm. on Housing, Transportation,and Community
Development of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I 10th Cong. 171 (2007)

[hereinafter Ending Mortgage Abuse] (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Senior Vice President and
Chief Appraiser, Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
92. Schmudde, supra note 21, at 734; see Martin, supra note 8, at 145-46.
93. Supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
94. See Ceresney, supra note 25, at 227; Schmudde, supra note 21, at 709.
95. See Ceresney, supra note 25, at 227; Schmudde, supra note 21, at 742.

Summer 2010]

CRA CKS IN THE FOUNDATION

1315

facilitate lenders' appraisal processes already have substantial
interests in obtaining inflated appraisals."
Unfortunately, appraisers are vulnerable to the pressure that
these self-interested parties exert. Because appraisers must analyze
local market data, they develop experience and familiarity within
limited geographic regions." As a consequence, appraisers rely on
continuous work from employers in their areas and are highly
susceptible to threats of discontinued work." When faced with such
threats, appraisers must choose between delivering accurate
appraisals despite the prospect of discontinued work or ostracism in
the marketplace and deliberately falsifying appraisals. Some
appraisers who have refused to give in to such pressure have been
forced out of the industry.99 Many others have succumbed.'o Given
that their livelihoods are at stake, it is not surprising that many
appraisers are making the wrong choice.
Recognizing the extent to which appraisers rely on continued
work, borrowers, lenders, and brokers have leveraged their authority
over appraiser selection and compensation.o' Indeed, pressure
exerted by borrowers became so pervasive during the savings and
loan crisis that borrower-solicited appraisals were prohibited.'0 2 More
recently, the responsibility for selecting and compensating appraisers
has resided with lenders and brokers.' But evidence suggests that
lenders and brokers have pressured appraisers to inflate property
values at an alarming rate. One recent survey showed that 90 percent
of appraisers have felt pressure to overvalue property.'" This data is
96. Supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
97. See Martin, supra note 8, at 154.
98. Richard D. Powers, President, Appraisal Inst., Address at the Appraisal Foundation

Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006).
99. Letter from Brian A. Glanville, President, Appraisal Inst., to The Honorable Paul
Sarbanes, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (Jul. 27, 2001) (on file
with author).
100. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 199 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
101. Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 171-72 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel,
Senior Vice President and Chief Appraiser, Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
102. See, e.g., Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 171-73 (testimony of Alan E.

Hummel, Senior Vice President and Chief Appraiser, Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
103. Id.
104. OCTOBER RESEARCH CORPORATION, 2007 NATIONAL APPRAISER SURVEY: EXECUTIVE

OVERVIEW 3 (2007), available at http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/newsadvocacy/downloads/
Itrs tstmny/2007/NtnlApprslSrvy.pdf.
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in agreement with investigations and anecdotal surveys performed by
the Appraisal Institute, a private appraiser professional
organization.' The Appraisal Institute claims that instances of client
pressure doubled between 2005 and 2007 despite two decades of
regulatory efforts aimed at promoting appraisal accuracy. 06
Lenders and brokers pressure appraisers in a variety of ways.
Sometimes they apply pressure that is forceful and direct. According
to appraisers, lenders and brokers often refuse to hire appraisers who
do not agree in advance to meet predetermined values-often before
the appraisers have even seen the properties.'17 Furthermore, when
appraisers submit honest appraisal values that are insufficient to
support mortgages, lenders often inform appraisers of the values
needed to complete the transactions.' 8 If appraisers refuse to revise
their appraisals to hit the numbers, lenders may refuse to pay them.'0 9
Even worse, some lenders threaten to blackball honest appraisers,
preventing them from working with other local lenders in the
future."o When one appraiser refused to deliver a predetermined
value, his broker client threatened to "let the 170 loan officers that
operate out of this branch know that you are by the book and lack the
intelligence to effectively get around the law.""' Given the limited
geographic scope of appraiser qualifications and experience, such
threats are especially compelling." 2
In other instances, the pressure is more subtle and difficult to
document. Lenders and brokers can apply pressure through no more
than a hint in a conversation. For instance, a lender or broker might
suggest that an appraiser consider different comparables that would
105. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 199 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
106. Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 17-18 (statement of Wade Henderson,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Leadership and Conference on Civil Rights).
107. John W. Schoen, Home Appraisal Fraud Is Costing You Money, MSNBC.COM, Jul. 15,

2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19750780/ns/business-personal finance.
108. See Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 172 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel,
Senior Vice President and Chief Appraiser, Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
109. See id
110. Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 17-18 (statement of Wade Henderson,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Leadership and Conference on Civil Rights); Legislative
Solutions, supra note 32, at 199 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief Executive Officer, Iowa
Residential Appraisal Company).
111. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 86 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
112. Powers, supra note 98.
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yield higher-value estimates."' A lender or broker might also imply
that future work is contingent on the outcome of pending
appraisals." 4 Such hints and implications may be nothing more than
casual comments or even legitimate communications aimed at
ensuring the quality of appraisals."' As such, appraisers may have
difficulty responding appropriately. For example, after he had noted
some decay on the front porch of a home, Alan E. Hummel, Chair of
the Government Relations Committee of the Appraisal Institute,
received the following e-mail from a broker:
Greetings,
I have a question on the following:

...

.

with the exception

of an area of the front porch flooring which decayed.
According to the owner, the basement gets some dampness
during storms through the newer area of the foundation. .'
Page 1 of 6.
Do you guys know Appraisals 101? This statement should
never be on the report. Now we face a big problem with the
lender here and this makes the customer very unhappy as
well.
This decayed area, is this essential to notice? What if it was
covered with a rug?
I need to know what to do here. How can you help us get
this in line? 'What is the exact problem? What is the cost to
cure?
Anything?
Please respond ASAP.
Thanks." 6
Such communications are especially troubling for appraisers. On
one hand, this broker questioned Hummel's competency and
suggested that the decay be covered with a rug. Thus, it appears clear
that the broker expected Hummel to overlook the decay and thereby
inflate the appraisal value. On the other hand, it is possible that this

113. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 199 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
114. See id.

115. Id.
116. Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 172 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Senior
Vice President and Chief Appraiser, Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
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was a legitimate inquiry meant to determine the extent and nature of
a problem. The broker may have intended only to explore possible
solutions in pursuit of the customer's interests. However, for the
appraiser who is frequently pressured and whose livelihood is on the
line, it is reasonable to assume the lender or broker expects
overvaluation and compliance. When asked, "How can you help us
get this in line?" it is no wonder that many appraisers respond by
inflating appraisals.
B. Challenges in Regulating Pressure

Despite the importance of independent and accurate appraisals,
regulatory efforts have failed to prevent loan-origination parties from
pressuring appraisers to deliver predetermined values. Appraisal
regulations under Title XI mandate that appraisals be performed
independently and impartially.'" These regulations place the onus for
ensuring appraisal accuracy on appraisers, who must ensure that their
opinions of value are unbiased. In addition, fraud laws broadly
proscribe the deliberate production of inflated appraisals that do not
reflect market values.
Although well-intentioned, these regulatory mechanisms are
ineffective for two reasons. First, they fail to insulate appraisers from
undue pressure to conform to the wishes of self-interested third
parties in order to receive future assignments. Second, appraiser
independence regulations and fraud laws are difficult to enforce."'
Because an appraisal is a subjective opinion of value, total accuracy
cannot be expected and a margin of error must be accepted.1' In all
but the most egregious cases, it would be difficult to prove that an
inflated appraisal is the product of improper influence and not merely
an independent opinion of value within the margin of error.'20 This is
even more problematic in actions for fraud, which require intentional
misrepresentations of material fact.12 ' Unless there were clear and
convincing evidence that an appraiser intentionally deviated from his

117. See 12 U.S.C.
118.
119.
120.
121.

§3350(10) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 323.2(a), 323.5 (2009).

Ceresney, supra note 25, at 227-28.
Id.; Martin, supra note 8, at 148.
Ceresney, supra note 25, at 227-28.
E.g., 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit

§ 23

(2001).
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or her independent estimate of value, it would be difficult to prove

fraud.122
Recent regulatory efforts such as Regulation Z of the 2008
Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act ("Regulation Z") and the
Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) include provisions that
expressly prohibit lenders and brokers from pressuring appraisers to
deliver predetermined values.' 23 Although it is too early to tell
whether these regulations will be effective, they are prone to
the same enforcement difficulties as appraisal independence
requirements. Because lenders and brokers can exert pressure in
subtle ways, there is a fine line between legitimate communications
and improper attempts to influence appraisals. Regulators will likely
struggle to prove the latter.
C. ProposedSolution

Improper influence exerted on appraisers is a serious problem
that is exacerbated by the agendas of self-interested loan origination
parties. Existing regulatory efforts that require appraisal
independence or prohibit the pressuring of appraisers are impractical
to enforce. Effective appraisal regulation must eliminate the
opportunity for interested parties, such as lenders and brokers, to
influence appraisal preparation. If this is to be accomplished, the
responsibility for selecting appraisers cannot reside with parties who
have incentives to condition future work on the delivery of favorable
appraisals. Instead, appraisers must be assigned in a fair and neutral
manner regardless of whether they hit the numbers.
1. Early Efforts and Missteps of the FHA
A neutral and independent appraisal assignment system is not a
new concept. For example, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA)124 used such a system prior to 1994.125 Under that system,
homes financed with loans insured by the FHA were appraised

122. Id.; Martin, supra note 8, at 148.
123. 12 C.F.R. §226.36 (2009).
124. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Federal Housing Administration,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (explaining FHA and
its subordinate position to HUD).
125. U.S.
GEN.
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-97-176,
HOMEOWNERSHIP:
INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN FHA's NEW SINGLE-FAMILY APPRAISAL PROCESS 2 (1997).
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almost exclusively by appraisers assigned from a fee panel (FHA Fee
Panel).126 Each loan was assigned by the FHA on a rotational basis to
one of approximately 6,000 appraisers on the FHA Fee Panel. 127
Lenders paid appraisers for completed appraisals and charged the
cost to borrowers. 12 8 The rotational basis assured appraisers of
receiving regular work. Accordingly, lenders had no power to
influence appraisers with promises or denials of future work. 121
Unfortunately, in 1994, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) implemented legislation that allowed lenders to
choose appraisers in the origination of single-family home mortgages
insured by the FHA.'o Accordingly, the FHA established a national
roster (FHA Roster) from which lenders could select appraisers.'
To assist lenders, the FHA provided an electronic database tool with
which lenders could search for appraisers in their localities.13 2 In
1996, HUD noted that lender-selected appraisers were performing
the vast majority of appraisals and terminated the FHA Fee Panel."'
Since then, lenders have selected appraisers from the FHA Roster to
perform all FHA appraisals. 134
In 2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(HERA) revised FHA standards for placement on the FHA Roster."
To be eligible for placement on the FHA Roster, appraisers must be
certified in their state of practice and cannot be listed on any federal
sanctions lists."' To ensure the implementation of these
requirements, the FHA developed a website-FHA Connectionthrough which appraisers can apply for placement on the FHA Roster

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 5. A "fee panel" appraiser is one was assigned to lenders by the FHA. See id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
See Letter from Brian A. Glanville to Paul Sarbanes, supra note 99, at 10.

130. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 125, at 5.

131. Id. These appraisers were required to be state-certified or state-licensed. Id.
132. Letter from Nicolas P. Retsinas, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S.
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees (Jan. 29, 1996) (on file with author)
("locality" is defined as the city or nearest city in which the property is located).
133. Id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 125, at 6.
134. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 125, at 6.

135. Letter from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S.
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers
(Dec. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
136. Id.
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and lenders can select appraisers.' Through the website and its
underlying hardware and software, appraiser certification is verified
in real time. 138 Additionally, the website references federal sanctions
lists to ensure that the FHA Roster lists only trustworthy
Lenders can use FHA Connection to search for
applicants.'
appraisers by name, license number, city, or state.140
Although the FHA Roster system has been in use for more than
fifteen years, recent market developments have raised doubts about
the wisdom of allowing lenders to select appraisers.14 ' During 2008,
the volume of FHA-insured single-family home mortgages tripled
from $59 billion to $180 billion. 4 2 Between 2006 and 2008, FHA
approval of new lenders increased by 525 percent.'43 According to
Kenneth M. Donohue, then-Inspector General of HUD, the surge in
FHA loans and new lenders will likely overwhelm the oversight
resources of the FHA, making lender monitoring difficult.'4 If so,
the FHA would be unable to prevent lenders from abusing their
appraiser-selection authority. In light of these risks, Donohue
recommended that the FHA eliminate lenders' influence on
appraisers by returning to an independent appraiser assignment
system similar to the FHA Fee Panel. "' Donohue asserted that
"[s]uch a move would relieve pressures on appraisers to return
predetermined values and would change a system based on
misplaced incentives."' 46
2. An Industry-Wide Solution Is Needed
The FHA's difficulties illustrate devastating developments in the
overall home mortgage industry and highlight the importance of
137. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., FHA Connection, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/
connect.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
138. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Appraiser Roster FAQs, http://www.hud.gov/
offices/hsg/sfh/appr/faqs appraiser.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Strengthening, supra note 27, at 50 (statement of Kenneth M. Donohue, Sr., Inspector
Gen., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).
142. Id. at 42.
143. Id.at 44.
144. Id. at 42.
145. Id. at 50.
146. Id at 51.
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independent and accurate appraisals. Appraisals will always be
susceptible to some inaccuracy resulting from the subjectivity of the
appraisal process and the unreliability of market data. However, the
improper influence of lenders could be eliminated through the
adoption of an independent appraiser assignment system akin to the
FHA Fee Panel. As such, it would be foolish to ignore appraiserassignment reforms that could reinforce the independence and
accuracy of appraisals.
One potential way to improve appraisal accuracy is to
implement an appraiser-assignment system capable of assigning
appraisers in a neutral manner. Such a system would need to account
for appraiser qualifications and the needs of individual appraisal
assignments. The FHA's current assignment of appraisers through
FHA Connection is promising because it is based on a national roster
with uniform eligibility requirements, it leverages automation, and it
matches appraiser qualifications with lender needs.147 These
capabilities should be incorporated into a comprehensive automated
appraisal-assignment system capable of randomly assigning qualified
appraisers in connection with all federally related transactions. Under
such a system, lenders could submit appraisal-assignment
information to be matched with appraiser qualifications.
For instance, a lender could provide information about the type
and location of the property to be appraised. Then, the system could
identify all appraisers on a federal appraisal roster with experience in
appraising properties of the specified type and in the specified
location. Finally, the system would randomly assign a qualified
appraiser to prepare the appraisal. The system could also categorize
and match lender needs with other appraiser qualifications and
characteristics, such as education and performance history. By
randomly assigning qualified appraisers in connection with federally
related transactions, appraisers would be assigned in a neutral
manner based on legitimate lender needs.
3. Potential Benefits of Randomly
Assigning Qualified Appraisers
Randomly assigning qualified appraisers used in connection
with federally related transactions would improve the accuracy and
147. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., supra note 138.
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reliability of appraisals. In such a random assignment system,
appraisers meeting the eligibility requirements of a national appraiser
roster would have an equal probability of receiving work regardless
of whether they are willing to deliver lenders' predetermined values.
These appraisers would prepare appraisals independently without the
concern that they must overvalue properties to receive future work.
As a result, appraisers would deliver appraisals that reflect true
market values with greater accuracy.
Moreover, matching legitimate lender needs with the skill and
experience necessary to appraise each unique property would result
in more accurate market value estimations and minimize risks
associated with mortgage transactions. The increased accuracy would
provide a more robust safeguard for the nation's financial system.
This would enhance both the legitimacy of the mortgage process and
the public's confidence in the national mortgage industry.
Lenders would also benefit from the use of a random assignment
system. Recent regulatory schemes such as Regulation Z and the
HVCC prohibit lenders from influencing appraisers.14 In addition to
a general prohibition, Regulation Z lists a number of specifically
forbidden communications.' 49 For example, lenders cannot inform
appraisers of the values necessary to complete loan transactions.'
While such well-intentioned provisions could prevent the pressuring
of appraisers, they could also deter valuable and legitimate
communication between the lender and the appraiser intended to
protect the consumer. Because consumers ultimately pay appraisal
costs, consumers benefit when lenders can confirm at the outset
whether a property could not support a requested loan. In such cases,
the cost of an appraisal could be avoided. When lenders hold
influence over appraisers, these legitimate communications are
suspicious and could have repercussions under new appraisal
regulations. As such, lenders must walk a fine line in conducting
necessary and legitimate communications with appraisers to ensure
that their actions are not perceived as improper. However, if lenders
were removed from the appraisal selection process through a random

148. 12 C.F.R.
2008).
149. 12. C.F.R.
150. Id.

§ 226.36
§ 226.36.

(2006); HoME VALUATION CODE OF CONDUCT

§

LB (Fannie Mae
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assignment system, the incentive to overvalue would be eliminated
and legitimate communications would be above suspicion.
4. Potential Drawbacks of Randomly
Assigning Qualified Appraisers
Despite the potential benefits of a random assignment system,
lenders have advocated for the right to select appraisers. In fact, the
FHA adopted its current lender select system in response to lender
concerns about the timeliness and quality of appraisals under the
FHA Fee Panel.' Lenders argued that lender selection of appraisers
would simplify and accelerate the appraisal process by eliminating
the need to contact a HUD field office to be assigned an appraiser
each time an appraisal is needed.'5 2 According to lenders, consumers
would benefit from having appraisals performed faster because loans
could close sooner. 153
While lender selection of appraisers accelerates the appraisal
process, the enormous damage that has resulted from lender pressure
suggests that acceleration is imprudent. Indeed, the benefit of
acceleration is insignificant when compared to the complex and
costly disciplinary actions that will be necessary to repair the harm
the mortgage industry has suffered as a result of lender pressure.154
Furthermore, by leveraging automated capabilities, qualified
appraisers could be assigned quickly and efficiently without the risk
that lenders would coerce predetermined values.
In addition to their concerns about the timeliness of the appraisal
process, lenders argued that appraisal quality suffers when appraisers
are assigned in a neutral manner. In advocating lender selection of
appraisers, FHA lenders raised concerns that Fee Panel appraisers
acted unprofessionally and submitted appraisals of varying quality.'55
Because appraisers were guaranteed future work on a rotational basis
after being placed on the Fee Panel, lenders believed that Fee Panel
appraisers who did not have to market themselves or compete with
other appraisers for work were complacent in preparing appraisals.'5 1
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 125, at 6.
Id.
Id at 8.
See supra Part I.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 125, at 6.
Id at 6; Letter from Brian A. Glanville to Paul Sarbanes, supra note 99, at 11.
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Even if some Fee Panel appraisers were complacent, the
speculative extent and impact of that complacency pales in
comparison to the demonstrated harm suffered by the mortgage
industry as a result of widespread appraisal inflation in response to
lender pressure. Furthermore, random assignment of appraisers
possessing particular qualifications will incentivize appraisers to gain
knowledge, experience, and a positive performance history in order
to qualify for more assignments.
Moreover, any panel or roster of appraisers will inevitably
include some complacent, dishonest, or incompetent appraisers.
Indeed, a recent survey of the FHA Roster revealed 3,480 appraisers
with expired licenses and 199 appraisers who had been sanctioned by
one or more states for various civil and criminal infractions.'" To
maintain the integrity of the appraisal industry, an effective appraiser
assignment system must include quality-control mechanisms to
ensure only honest and competent appraisers are placed on the
appraiser panel or roster. The capabilities of FHA Connection to
search appraiser characteristics, verify qualifications in real time, and
cross-reference external databases could be leveraged to ensure a
high-quality national roster of appraisers. Substandard appraisers
could be identified and removed without delay. The moral character
of roster appraisers could be substantiated by referencing state and
federal databases containing civil and criminal histories.
With recent regulatory reforms such as Regulation Z and the
HVCC, lender-selection advocates might argue that further reforms
are not needed to prevent the pressuring of appraisers. However, both
Regulation Z and the HVCC have unnecessarily complicated the
appraisal process. As previously discussed, the express prohibition of
influential communications contained in Regulation Z may inhibit
legitimate communications between lenders and appraisers. 15
Similarly, in order to avoid violating the express prohibition of
appraiser pressuring in the HVCC, many lenders have outsourced the
appraisal function to independent appraisal management companies
(AMCs) that employ, assign, and compensate appraisers.'59 Because
157. Strengthening, supra note 27, at 50 (statement of Kenneth M. Donahue, Sr., Inspector
Gen., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).
158. 12 C.F.R. § 226.36 (2006).
159. Strengthening, supra note 27, at 87 (testimony of Marc Savitt, President, National
Association of Mortgage Brokers).
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AMCs underpay appraisers, the appraisers who are willing to work
with AMCs are often less experienced and less likely to accurately
determine market value.160 Furthermore, because AMCs only
perform the administrative functions of the appraisal process and do
not actually prepare appraisals, they are not subject to the full slate of
appraisal regulations, guidelines, and policies.161 Indeed, AMCs are
entirely unregulated at the federal level and are subject to appraisalrelated regulation in only three states.162
IV. DEFICIENCIES IN THE
APPRAISAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
Unfortunately, improper appraisal practices such as client
pressure have become pervasive under existing appraisal regulations.
Structural deficiencies severely weaken the effectiveness of
regulation under Title XI. The distribution of regulatory
responsibilities among independent entities has resulted in a
patchwork system plagued by inefficiency and inconsistency. No
single entity has sufficient authority to effectively regulate the
appraisal industry. If improper and harmful appraisal practices are to
be identified and addressed in a timely manner, the uniform appraisal
standards envisioned under Title XI must be enforced consistently. It
is imperative that appraisal regulatory responsibilities be
consolidated at the federal level where adequate knowledge and
resources can be devoted to ensuring the accuracy and reliability of
appraisals used in connection with federally related transactions.
A. The DistributionofRegulatory
Responsibilities Under Title X7

Title XI distributes appraisal regulatory responsibilities among
various private, state, and federal entities.'63 The Appraisal
Foundation, a private nonprofit organization composed of groups
from the real estate industry, established minimum appraisal
requirements. '

These requirements are articulated in both the

Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP),
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 88.
Id.at 87.
Id
See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3352 (2006).
See id. § 3345; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at

6.
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which sets forth minimum standards for performing appraisals, and
the Appraiser Qualification Criteria (AQC), which outlines minimum
education, experience, and examination requirements for
appraisers.16 The states are responsible for enforcing compliance
with appraisal standards and also for certifying appraisers.'6 6 At a
minimum, state certification criteria must incorporate the AQC.167 In
addition, states have the option to license appraisers using stateestablished criteria that need not incorporate the AQC.16 8The federal
financial institution regulators' 69 are responsible for establishing and
enforcing appraisal requirements for insured institutions"'e in their
jurisdictions.' Finally, the Appraisal Subcommittee of the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council is the principal federal
agency responsible for monitoring the activities of the other entities
under Title XI.' 72
1. Rulemaking Responsibilities Under Title XI
The separation of rulemaking and enforcement responsibilities
within the complex regulatory structure of Title XI is problematic.
While the Appraisal Foundation establishes and maintains minimum
appraisal standards and appraiser criteria, state and federal regulators
are responsible for enforcement."' As such, the Appraisal
Foundation is not optimally situated to identify and address changing
market conditions and circumstances relevant to the appraisal
profession that become apparent through enforcement.'7 4 Indeed, the
pervasiveness of lender pressure may be due, at least in part, to an
inability of the Appraisal Foundation to recognize and address the
165. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5-6; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3346;
APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD., APPRAISAL FOUND., APPRAISAL STANDARDS BOARD & USPAP,

available at https://appraisalfoundation.sharefile.com/d-sd342877f2794368a (last visited Mar. 4,
2010).

166. See 12 U.S.C.
167. See id

§ 3346.

§ 3345(a).

168. See id. §§3342-3343, 3345-3346.
169. See id

§ 3350(6).

170. See id§ 3350(7).
171. See id.
§§ 3339, 3341-3342, 3345(d).
172. See id.
§ 3347.
173. See id. § 3345(a) (defining Appraisal Foundation rulemaking authority); id § 3346
(defining state enforcement authority); id. § 3339 (defining federal financial institutions
regulatory agency ("FedFin") enforcement authority).
174. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 11.
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problem before it became widespread. Other problems arise when
the rulemaking activities of the Appraisal Foundation and the
enforcement activities of the states and the federal financial
institution regulators are out of sync. In a 2004 survey, 70 percent of
states reported that USPAP updates were so frequent that state
appraiser regulatory agencies"' could not keep pace in revising state
law to reflect the most current USPAP as Title XI requires."'
Even more problematic than the separation of rulemaking and
enforcement responsibilities is the concurrent rulemaking authority
granted to the states and the federal financial institution regulators.
Under Title XI, the Appraisal Foundation establishes only minimum
appraisal standards and appraiser criteria.17 Each of the states and
the federal financial institution regulators is free to establish
additional appraisal standards and criteria."' To date, more than half
of the states and all five federal financial institution regulators have
adopted appraisal standards criteria that exceed the Appraisal
Foundation's guidelines.'79 Additionally, the state appraisal
regulatory agencies take a variety of approaches in implementing
Title XI.'so These variations complicate national oversight and
enforcement of the appraisal industry, as federal regulators and
mortgage-industry participants must navigate myriad inconsistent
regulatory schemes. Moreover, appraisers who cross state lines, as
contemplated by Title XI,'"' must parse out the appraisal regulations
specific to each individual state. Under this convoluted system, it is
unsurprising that appraisal accuracy has suffered.
A prime example of this inconsistency is the state-appraiserlicensing system, which has been the target of much criticism from

175. See 12 U.S.C.
at 3.

§ 3350(1); Letter from Brian A. Glanville to Paul Sarbanes, supra note 99,

176. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 13.

177. See 12 U.S.C. § 3345.
178. See id § 3339 (defining FedFin authority to implement additional standards); id
(defining FedFin authority to establish additional appraiser qualification criteria).

§ 3345

179. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 6-7. See generally 12 C.F.R.

§§ 34.42-.47, 323.1-.7, 564.1-.6, 722.1-.7 (2009) (promulgating additional appraisal criteria for

the OCC, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA, respectively); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Law,
Regulations, Related Acts: Statements of Policy, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/
5000-4800.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2009).
180. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 13.
181. See 12 U.S.C. § 3351 (contemplating temporary practice and reciprocity).
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appraisers and regulators alike.18 2 Title XI requires federal financial
institution regulators to prescribe categories of federally related
transactions that should use a state-certified appraiser and categories
Pursuant to this
that may use a state-licensed appraiser.'
requirement, federal financial institution regulators have determined
that certified or licensed appraisers may prepare non-complex'8 4
residential-property appraisals in connection with transactions below
$1 million in value.' Title XI mandates that state-certification
criteria must incorporate the AQC at a minimum.'86 In contrast,
licensing criteria are left entirely to the discretion of the states.
Accordingly, licensing criteria vary significantly from state to state.
Some states' licensing criteria are similar to their certification
criteria,' while other states' licensing criteria are significantly less
demanding.' Indeed, some states do not require appraiser licensing
at all.' Under such lenient or non-existent licensing criteria,
appraisers of lesser competence can be licensed. Because the national
median home value9 o is well below the $1 million threshold above
which the federal financial institution regulators require the use of

182. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 14.

183. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3343.
184. An appraisal of a one- to four-family residential property is complex if the property to be
appraised, the form of ownership, or the market conditions are atypical. See 12 C.F.R. 323.2(e).
185. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3342-3343; 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.43, 323.3, 564.3, 722.3 (outlining
transactions for which appraisals may be prepared by state certified or licensed appraisers as
mandated by the OCC, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA, respectively).
186. 12 U.S.C. § 3345(a).
187. Most states require 300 hours of education and 3000 hours of experience for certification
compared to 150 hours of education and 2000 hours of experience for licensing. Appraisal
Subcommittee, Fed. Fin. Insts. Exam. Council, State Operations and Requirements,
https://www.asc.gov/State-Appraiser-Regulatory-Programs/StateOperationsAndRequirements.
aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
188. Connecticut requires 300 hours of education and 3000 hours of experience for
certification compared to 75 hours of education and no experience for licensing. Id.
189. Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming have voluntary licensing programs. Id.
190. In the fourth quarter of 2009, the national median home price for existing homes was
$172,900.
National
Association
of
Realtors
Metropolitan
Median
Prices,
http://www.realtor.org/research/research/metroprice (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (follow "Current
Report: Single-family 4h Quarter 2009" hyperlink). In January 2010, the national average home
price for new homes was $254,500. U.S. Census Bureau News, New Residential Sales in January
2010, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.census.gov/const/newressales.pdf.
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certified appraisers, licensed appraisers of questionable competence
could participate in a significant number of mortgage transactions.1
2. Enforcement Responsibilities Under Title XI
The failure of appraisal regulators to collect and share
information frustrates the detection of improper appraisal practices'"
and ultimately prevents the enforcement of appraisal regulations.
Improper appraisal practices, such as appraisal inflation, often go
undetected unless a pattern of defaults is associated with an
appraiser. 9 ' Because inflated appraisals increase risks of default,
such a pattern can indicate a corresponding pattern of appraisal
inflation.19 Similarly, a pattern of rapid property appreciation or an
appraiser's extensive disciplinary history can raise red flags.'
Unfortunately, many appraisal regulators do not collect this
information.'9 6 Those that do are unwilling or unable to share it with
other regulators and mortgage-industry participants.' As a result,
appraisal regulators working with incomplete data cannot see the big
picture necessary to detect improper appraisal practices. Meanwhile,
unscrupulous and unqualified appraisers may continue practicing
without consequences.
Reporting deficiencies also limit the detection of improper
appraisal practices. If appraisal regulators do not receive complaints
about improper appraisal practices, they cannot take corrective
action.198 Unfortunately, because there is no central reporting
191. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 7, 14-15; Letter from Brian A.

Glanville to Paul Sarbanes, supra note 99.
192. Unless otherwise indicated, "improper appraisal practices" includes both incompetence
and misconduct.
193. Mortgage Fraud and Its Impact on Mortgage Lenders: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. 4-5

(2004) (statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Donahue, Sr., Inspector Gen., Deptartment of Housing and
Urban Development).
194. Id at 21 (statement of Hon. John C. Weicher, Assistant Secretary, Housing/Federal
Housing Comm'r, Department of Housing and Urban Development).
195. Mark Simpson, Dir. of Prop. Standards, Fannie Mae, Address at the Appraisal Found.
Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006); Brad Davis, Vice President and Chief Appraiser,
Morgan Stanley, Address at the Appraisal Found. Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13,2006).
196. See Strengthening, supra note 27, at 50, 57 (statement of Kenneth M. Donahue, Sr.,
Inspector Gen., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).
197. Id.
198. Larry Disney, Executive Dir., Ky. Real Estate Appraisers Bd., Address at the Appraisal
Foundation Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006); David Deverman, Nat'l Ass'n of
Realtors, Address at the Appraisal Foundation Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006);
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repository for complaints, improper appraisal practices often go
unreported.'99 Although appraisers can report instances of lender
pressure to state banking regulators or federal financial institution
regulators, the appraisers must submit those reports in writing and in
accordance with the procedures of the regulatory agency that has
jurisdiction over the offending lender.200 The myriad independent
appraisal regulators can make determining the correct agency and
procedure overwhelming. State appraisal regulatory agencies rarely
receive complaints from lenders and federal financial institutions.20'
When state appraisal regulatory agencies do receive complaints,
those complaints are frequently submitted in formats or manners that
the agency cannot readily process.202 At the same time, disparities in
states' complaint filing requirements frustrate financial institutions.203
Some states require only the submission of an allegation of
misconduct, while others require specific forms, notarization, or
witness testimony. These disparities place a serious burden on
entities attempting to report appraisal fraud2" and prevent many
instances of improper appraisal practice from being detected and
corrected.
Even when improper appraisal practices are detected, state
appraisal regulators lack the resources necessary to investigate and
take corrective action.205 In one year, more than 60 percent of state
appraisal regulatory agencies failed to perform their enforcement
responsibilities.20 6 Most states cite staffing deficiencies as the
primary impediment to their investigation of appraisal misconduct.207
William Stem, Supervisory Special Agent, Fed. Bureau of Investigation and Dir. of Prop.
Standards, Fannie Mae, Address at the Appraisal Found. Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13,
2006).
199. Douglas Vincent, Chief Collateral Officer, Countrywide Bank, Address at the Appraisal
Foundation Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006); Letter from Brian A. Glanville to Paul
Sarbanes, supra note 99.
200. Letter from Brian A. Glanville to Paul Sarbanes, supra note 99, at 6.
201. Disney, supra note 198.
202. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 18-19.

203. Id. at 18.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 3; Douglas Vincent, Chief Collateral Officer, Countrywide Bank, Address at the
Appraisal Found. Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006).
206. Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra note 91, at 178 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Senior
Vice President and Chief Appraiser, Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
207. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 3, 12-13.
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The average state appraisal agency employs three staff members
responsible for supervising approximately 2,000 appraisers.20 8
Furthermore, many state agencies report that they share
administrative staff, office space, and even investigators-many of
whom have no appraisal experience-with other state agencies.209
Indeed, some state agencies police all licenses granted under their
jurisdiction, whether the licenses are for appraisers, contractors, or
hairdressers. 210 Although appraisal enforcement activities are funded
at the state level by appraiser registration and licensing fees, many
states reallocate these fees to their general funds, leaving state
appraisal agencies with insufficient funding.2 1 '
Even when they receive appropriately submitted complaints,
state appraisal agencies often fail to resolve them in a timely
manner.212 A representative of Fannie Mae has asserted that one-third
of state appraisal agencies take three years to address complaints.2 13
Of 860 complaints submitted by Fannie Mae between 2001 and
2002, 469 remained unresolved four years later.2 14 In some states,
statutes of limitation preclude disciplinary action by the time
enforcement agencies conclude their lengthy investigations.215
Moreover, unscrupulous and incompetent appraisers may
continue to practice until regulators complete investigations and
impose discipline.2 16 For example, after pleading guilty to appraisal
fraud in federal court and admitting responsibility for government
losses of $500,000 to $800,000, a Maryland appraiser brazenly
applied for a renewal of his appraisal license.217 While he was
208. Id. at 12.

209. Id.
210. Powers, supra note 98.
211. Letter from David L. Ledford, Senior Vice President, Hous. Fin, and Land Dev. to
National Association of Home Builders, to the Appraisal Foundation (Mar. 2, 2009) (on file with
author).
212. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 18; Ending Mortgage Abuse, supra

note 91, at 178 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Senior Vice President and Chief Appraiser,
Forsythe Appraisals, LLC).
213. Mark Simpson, Dir. of Prop. Standards, Fannie Mae, Address at the Appraisal
Foundation Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006).
214. Id.
215. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 18.

216. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 201 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
217. Id
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awaiting sentencing, he submitted an online application for license
renewal in which he indicated that he had not been convicted of any
felonies. 218 A year later, the Maryland Commission of Real Estate
Appraisers and Home Inspectors renewed his license for three years
despite his conviction, which became official shortly after he
submitted the renewal application.2 19
3. Oversight Responsibilities Under Title XI
Title XI charges the Appraisal Subcommittee with monitoring
state appraisal activities. 220 However, the Subcommittee's only
means for ensuring state compliance with Title XI is state
decertification, which would prohibit all appraisers in a state from
performing appraisals in conjunction with federally related
transactions.22 1 Such a severe penalty would devastate and cripple the
real estate and mortgage markets in a decertified state. 222
Accordingly, the Appraisal Subcommittee's decertification
authority-often referred to as the "atomic hammer"2 23 --has never
been tested.224
B. AppraisalRegulatory ResponsibilitiesMust Be
Consolidatedat the FederalLevel
Two prominent themes among the multitude of federal appraisal
regulatory schemes are the protection of federal financial interests
and the promotion of public confidence in federally related
transactions. Given this concern for federal interests, it is surprising
that appraisal regulatory responsibilities have been dispersed among
federal, state, and private entities without effective federal oversight.
This curious structure has led to confusion, inconsistency,
and, ultimately, a system incapable of ensuring the accuracy of

218. Id Because he was not officially convicted of a felony until he was sentenced, the
appraiser's assertion was technically correct. Id.
219. Id
220. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3332, 3347 (2006).
221. See id.

§ 3347; U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 3, 13 (2004).

222. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 13-14 (2004).
223. Legislative Solutions, supra note 32, at 200 (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief

Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company).
224. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 14 (2004).
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appraisals.22 5 In order to improve appraisal regulation and safeguard
national interests, appraisal regulatory responsibility must be
consolidated under a federal entity capable of maintaining,
monitoring, and enforcing appraisal standards.
1. Potential Benefits of Consolidating Appraisal Regulatory
Responsibilities at the Federal Level
The benefits of consolidating supervision of the appraisal
industry at the federal level include enhanced cohesion between the
establishment, oversight, and enforcement of appraisal standards and
appraiser qualifications criteria. A central federal entity would be
responsible for amending appraisal standards and would also play a
direct role in monitoring and enforcing those standards. Accordingly,
that federal entity would be better informed about the applicability
and feasibility of those standards, allowing it to identify deficiencies
and respond with appropriate reforms while retaining consistent
standards.
Under the direction of a federal entity with consolidated
regulatory authority, parties involved in the loan-origination process
could submit complaints to a single centralized agency. Without
obstacles to reporting and sharing appraisal-related information, such
information could be compiled and manipulated in a comprehensive
database that provides early warning signals of instances of appraisal
misconduct. With access to such a database, a federal regulator could
routinely review a set percentage of appraisals and appraisers. Thus,
a federal body could detect appraisal misconduct sooner, thereby
enabling timely and consistent appraiser discipline and preventing
problem appraisers from maintaining status on federal rosters. Most
importantly, by identifying and disciplining liable appraisers, a
cohesive and adequately funded federal agency would deter future
appraisal misconduct and limit the potential for mortgage fraud.
2. Potential Drawbacks of Consolidating Appraisal Regulatory
Responsibilities at the Federal Level
In spite of the substantial benefits of a central federal appraisal
regulatory agency, some might argue that the diverse inputs of
private, state, and federal entities employed under the current
225. Strengthening, supra note 27, at 57 (statement of Kenneth M. Donohue, Sr., Inspector
Gen., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).
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regulatory structure are indispensable. The benefit of private-industry
input would be lost if the Appraisal Foundation no longer had
responsibility for establishing and amending appraisal standards.
Arguably, the unique circumstances of each state and the varying
interests of institutions under the purview of federal financial
institution regulators require flexibility to tailor appraisal standards
and disciplinary procedures to their varying needs.
While these arguments warrant some consideration, a central
federal regulatory agency would retain these benefits. Such an
agency could establish procedures and mechanisms to capture and
implement the concerns of the private appraisal industry, the states,
and the federal financial institution regulators. Indeed, the current
Title XI structure contains many such mechanisms.226 Although the
federal financial institution regulators currently maintain the
authority to individually specify standards and criteria above and
beyond the Appraisal Foundation's minimal requirements, the
regulations set forth by the federal financial institution regulators
have long been identical.22 7
Further, while some states have adopted regulations above and
beyond those codified in Title XI, such tailoring seems unnecessary
in the context of appraisals prepared for federally related mortgage
transactions. Because virtually all modern mortgage transactions are
funded, insured, and sold at the national level, supporting appraisals
should be prepared under a uniform federal standard. Accordingly,
consolidated regulation by a central federal body communicating
with the private sector, states, and federal financial institution
regulators would be optimal.
Dissenters may also oppose consolidated federal regulation of
the appraisal industry on the ground that funding is unavailable for a
federal entity with such broad responsibilities. Even if annual
registry fees such as those accumulated by the Appraisal
Subcommittee were allocated to a federal regulatory body, those
funds would likely prove insufficient. On the other hand, a federal
agency performing licensing and certification functions could

226. Supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
227. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 34.42-33.47 (OCC), 323.1-323.7 (FDIC), 564.1-564.6
(OTS), 722.1-722.7 (NCUA); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 179.
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allocate those fees exclusively to appraisal regulatory activities rather
than to state general funds.
A federal regulatory agency could also receive funding by
collecting a nominal fee for appraisals prepared in connection with
federally related transactions. If such a "tax" remained minimal,
loan-origination costs would not increase significantly and the real
estate lending market likely would not suffer. Moreover, given the
volume of appraisals prepared nationwide, a minimal "tax" would
accrue into a substantial fund.
Finally, increased federal funding for a federal regulatory entity
could be made available. The feasibility of increased funding seems
especially plausible in light of the substantial funding provided to
law enforcement agencies through the Fraud Enforcement Recovery
Act of 2009, which Congress enacted to prosecute mortgage fraud. 228
Given the great potential of effective appraisal regulation to deter
mortgage fraud, the legislature should provide at least as much
funding for proactive prevention as has been provided for reactive
prosecution. 22 9 Thus, funding for supervision of the appraisal
industry should not be a serious hurdle to the creation of a central
federal body.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the importance of the appraisal process, as evidenced by
the devastating consequences of its neglect in the past two major
national financial crises, restoration of the independence and quality
of appraisals is imperative. Regulators must carefully examine the
nature of appraisals and their role in the real estate lending process to
promote independent and accurate appraisals. With an understanding
of the subjectivity inherent in the appraisal process and the
conflicting interests of the parties whom the process is meant to
protect, regulators can identify the reasons why appraisal regulation
has failed thus far. Accordingly, regulators must recognize that broad
and decisive action is necessary to ensure the soundness of the
appraisal process and the national mortgage industry that depends on
it.

228. See id. at 1617.
229. John D. Arterberry, Executive Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Keynote Address at
the Appraisal Foundation Valuation Fraud Symposium (Oct. 13, 2006).
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Effective regulatory reforms must eliminate loan origination
parties' ability to improperly influence appraisers' determinations of
value. To achieve this end, regulators must draft and enforce
regulations that will remove interested parties from positions of
influence in the appraisal selection process. Additionally, to ensure
that appraisal regulations are adequately maintained, monitored, and
enforced, regulatory responsibilities must be consolidated at the
federal level.
These reforms are substantial and will be met by resistance from
some members of the mortgage industry. The changes will come at a
cost and will present logistical challenges at the outset. In the long
run, however, these measures will prevent the disastrous financial
consequences that have stemmed from appraisal regulatory
shortcomings in the past. Ultimately, the enhanced soundness and
public perception of the mortgage industry will justify the sacrifice.
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